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Reﬂecting on past events and reﬂecting on future events are two fundamentally different
processes, each traveling in the opposite direction of the other through conceptual time.
But what we are able to imagine seems to be constrained by what we have previously
experienced, suggesting a close link between memory and prospection. Recent theories
suggest that recalling the past lies at the core of imagining and planning for the future.The
existence of this link is supported by evidence gathered from neuroimaging, lesion, and
developmental studies.Yet it is not clear exactly how the novel episodes people construct
in their sense of the future develop out of their historical memories. There must be
intermediary processes that utilize memory as a basis on which to generate future oriented
thinking. Here, we review studies on goal-directed processing, associative learning,
cognitive control, and creativity and link them with research on prospection. We suggest
that memory cooperates with additional functions like goal-directed learning to construct
and simulate novel events, especially self-referential events. The coupling between
memory-related hippocampus and other brain regions may underlie such memory-based
prospection. Abnormalities in this constructive process may contribute to mental disorders
such as schizophrenia.
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“Imagination is everything. It is the preview of life’s coming
attractions.”
— Albert Einstein
Humans can not only live in themoment butmust also revisit their
past experiences and experience the imagined future in advance.
During the past century, a variety of modern philosophical, psy-
chological, and contemporary works have served to galvanize
interest in the relationship between remembering and imagining.
For instance, Khalil Gibran noted, “Yesterday is but today’s mem-
ory and tomorrow is today’s dream;” James T. McCay argued,
“Tomorrow you promise yourself will be different, yet tomorrow
is too often a repetition of today;” while Walt Disney Company
underlined, “Here you leave today an enter the world of yester-
day, tomorrow, and fantasy.” We are not clairvoyants, but the
ability to think about and plan for possible future of the world-
prospection-helps us to foresee, set goals, pay close attention to,
and represent what is yet to come (Buckner and Carroll, 2007;
Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; D’Argembeau and Demblon, 2012).
Prospection is crucial for our daily life because it allows individ-
uals to ensure their future interests and prevent future losses in
advance. Daily life experiences teach us that our concept of the
future closely resembles what we have experienced in the past. If
you were asked to picture a day in the life you might lead 20 years
from now, you might imagine yourself waking up to the sun ris-
ing in the east, eating breakfast prepared by a robot, traveling
to work in a high-tech vehicle, and so on. The objects, events,
logic, emotions, progress of time, and sense of space making up
this imagined world are all similar to the features of the world
we have known from lived experience, however, much things may
be warped by the forces of imagination; even the aliens we tend
to imagine resemble human beings in many ways. It is difﬁcult
to conceive of a future that is absolutely different from the past
that is stored in one’s memory. It is intuitively obvious that we
count on our memories to help us conceptually construct the
future. When we envision a life in the future or make plans in
anticipation of what is ahead, we consciously or unconsciously
use our past experiences or acquired knowledge as a suggestive
framework on which to construct new ideas about the future.
Hence, remembering the past paves the ground for imagining the
future.
Although prospection uses elements of memory to form men-
tal images of possible future scenarios, memory alone does
not constitute an imagined future. One key difference between
thinking about the past and thinking about the future con-
cerns the subjective concept of time. Memory, however, is
not the only contributing factor in prospection. We propose
that additional processes must kick into carry out prospec-
tion, so as to enable, at least, the organization of present
actions, the setting of goals, selection among possible solutions
and decisions making. One thing to note is that throughout
the review we will employ a variety of conceptual terms refer-
ring to the processes enabling prospection, including “imagining
the future,” “future simulation,” and “future thinking.” Simi-
larly, we also employ the terms “memory,” “remembering the
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past,” and “retrospection” in an approximately interchangeable
manner.
In this review, we examine evidence for the intimate link
between imagining the future and remembering the past, from
neuroimaging, lesion, and development research. Further, we
discuss how the gap between memory and prospection can be
bridged by discussing several lines of research which elucidate
how prior experiences shape future stimulation. Speciﬁcally, this
article discusses four key points of focus: (1) the overlapping
processes underlying both memory and prospection; (2) the dis-
tinct components guiding memory to shape prospection; (3)
how studies on psychiatric disorders provide evidence elucidat-
ing the unique functions of these distinct processes; (4) a novel
model demonstrating the overlapping and distinct components
underlying memory and prospection.
OVERLAP BETWEEN MEMORY AND PROSPECTION
It has been proposed that imagining the future relies on remem-
bering the past (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004; Busby
and Suddendorf, 2005; Addis et al., 2008; Kwan et al., 2010;
Mullally and Maguire, 2013). Primary interest in the neural
mechanisms of prospection and memory can be traced to neu-
ropsychological observations with respect to different paradigms.
Memory and prospection often collectively draw on several com-
ponents such as visual modality-leads us to move from one
place to another (Rosenbaum et al., 2004; Hassabis and Maguire,
2007); and emotions-help to cope with a diversity of situa-
tions (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004, 2006); as well
as self-referential processing-helps us to process information into
a complex and coherent content (Szpunar et al., 2007). The spe-
ciﬁc knowledge and exemplars in memory can be utilized to guide
prospection.
NEUROIMAGING STUDIES
Recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that imagining
the future depends on several neural processes involved in remem-
bering the past (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004; Addis
et al., 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire,
2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Schacter
et al., 2012). There are several psychological processes that are cru-
cial to both memory and prospection and these processes might
be associated with the same brain regions in both memory and
prospection. Of note, the much used paradigm in experiments is
that of cue-word task, as shown below in Figure 1.
Visual–spatial context
A context is widely used as an interpretation of an event; it con-
tains vast information in mind to mediate optimal behavior. The
key role of context processing is proactive cognitive control (Barch
and Ceaser, 2012; Braver, 2012). It assigns spatial location, tempo-
ral information, and further necessary conditions to mediate the
memory of the past and the prospection of the future. There are
many forms of contexts such as spatial context, temporal context,
and cognitive context. Rather essential one is visual–spatial con-
text processing for memory and prospection (Maren et al., 2013).
When we remember or imagine a rosy holiday on the beach in
Hawaii, everything which has happened or which might happen
ﬁrst comes to our minds: the blissful moment, the captivating sea
view, and our lovely companions, as illustrated in Figure 2. Such
a visual–spatial context provides perceptions and conﬁguration of
time and place to frame the memory of the past and on which to
construct the scenario of the imagined future.
Memory and prospection share similar visual–spatial con-
texts including places getting us from one place to another and
features of the objects (Rosenbaum et al., 2004; Hassabis and
Maguire, 2007). Furthermore, they might both require access-
ing representations of stored visual stimuli (Rosenbaum et al.,
2004). Separate lines of research suggested that visual mem-
ory and visual imagery may rely on similar regions (e.g., the
frontal-parietal control regions and the occipital–temporal sen-
sory regions; Slotnick et al., 2012). Scene construction is a
speciﬁc example of visual–spatial associative construction that
combines scattered visual elements together to ﬂexibly construct
an event as a whole (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Maguire and
Mullally, 2013). Neuropsychological evidence of lesion with hip-
pocampus conﬁrms that the hippocampus is crucial for memory
and navigation (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Spiers et al., 2001).
Besides, in contrast to control group, patients with hippocam-
pus amnesia could not imagine new experiences in response
to verbal cues outlining a range of common place scenarios
(Hassabis et al., 2007b). Scene, in nature, is a highly utilized means
of collecting information. In this way, scene construction facili-
tates the construction of atemporal scenes and forms a foundation
with the details of past and future. Hassabis and Maguire (2007)
emphasized that scene construction needs visual–spatial context
processing, in which memory and prospection both retrieve and
provide relevant information into a complex and coherent spatial
content.
Self-processing
The self is the glue that binds together the past and the future in
a consistent manner. To project oneself forward and backward in
time is deﬁned as a capacity for “mental time travel” (Suddendorf
and Corballis, 2007). With regard to memory and prospection, the
self-referential processing covers at least two dimensions: (1) that
of representing oneself as an unique individual (e.g., construct-
ing personal scenarios; Szpunar et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2008)
and (2) that of processing scenarios related to personal goals and
self-schema (e.g., attaching personal signiﬁcance to constructed
scenarios; D’Argembeau et al., 2010).
The cue-word task,much used in the study of autobiographical
memory, is typical of investigations intomemory and prospection.
In this task, participants get cues (e.g., the cue word: Barbecue)
and are instructed to imagine a personal experience of a future
event, remember a personally experienced past event, or imag-
ine a speciﬁc celebrity (e.g., the cue word: Bill Clinton) with no
explicit temporal reference. Speciﬁcally, imagining a familiar indi-
vidual involved neither the self-processing nor the mental time
travel, and therefore served as the baseline condition. Szpunar
et al. (2007) instructed participants undergoing fMRI to imag-
ine themselves in a plausible future [Self-Future (SF)], remember
themselves in a past episode [Self-Remember (SR)],or to imagine a
speciﬁc event concerning a celebrity [Clinton-Imagine (CI)]. Dur-
ing scanning, participants were required to think about an image
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FIGURE 1 | A typical cue-word task for probing mental conceptions of
past and future events. (A) At the beginning of each trial, an event cue
word is presented on a computer screen, whereupon participants are
instructed to describe in detail either what they may remember of a
speciﬁc episode in the past or to imagine a plausible episode in the future.
The orienting cue (either to remember or imagine) is shown above the
event cue. Following the description stage in which they provide their
descriptions as requested, participants rate each episode’s phenomenology
(such as its vividness) on a 5-point Likert scale. (B) The subsequent panel in
Figure 1 shows primary cue types and corresponding instructions from
Hassabis et al. (2007b), Sharot et al. (2007) and Szpunar et al. (2007). For
example, emotional cues contain positive and negative words, and
participants are instructed to imagine or remember an emotional event
according to the given word and orienting cue.
as vividly as possible. At the end of experiment, participants ﬁn-
ished post-scan questionnaires and rated the phenomenological
characteristics (e.g., vividness, emotional arousal, and emotional
intensity) of the mental images they had constructed during the
procedure. Post-experiment questionnaires indicated that mem-
ory and prospection differed in their phenomenological qualities
but that they both included conceptions of self in time. Fur-
thermore, a set of regions (e.g., the posterior cingulate cortext
(PCC; the hippocampus) revealed no variations in activation dur-
ing prospection and remembering (although they did display
greater overall activity than during the process of imagining a
speciﬁc event), and these results were dovetailed with studies
implicating activation in the frontopolar and the medial tempo-
ral lobe (MTL) region (Okuda et al., 2003). However, imagining
a non-personal event might rely more on semantic knowledge
but not self-referential processing. Imagining the future related
to self was associated with activation in the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) and the PCC (D’Argembeau et al., 2010). Pre-
vious studies linked the MPFC with self-referential processing,
and especially coding and evaluating personal goal (D’Argembeau
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of memory and prospection concerning visual–spatial context processing. Once we trace the memory or think about the future, a
visual–spatial scene appears in our mind. Constructions of memory and prospection always reﬂect numerous similarities in scene construction.
et al., 2005; Schmitz and Johnson, 2006). Moreover, the PCC is
related to previously experienced visual–spatial context (Szpunar
et al., 2007; Summerﬁeld et al., 2009). Generally, representa-
tion of self is the process of projecting oneself into memory.
Prospection tends to incorporate more details and can inﬂu-
ence a stronger subjective feeling, which is essential to mental
simulations.
Emotions
Episodic simulations frequently display inﬂuence from the emo-
tional affection of whoever is simulating them. Most everyday
mental simulations are emotionally arousing, positively or nega-
tively charged. Constructing positive or negative events mentally
creates more details than neutral ones (D’Argembeau and Van
der Linden, 2004, 2006). People intend to hold a positive self-
concept and remember a rosy future during memory (Szpunar
et al., 2012). Similarly, people are more likely to be overconﬁdent
and optimistic about the future (Sharot et al., 2007). Emotion
signals generate speciﬁc simulations when retrieving pieces of
information from memory (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden,
2007; Schacter et al., 2012). Thus, emotion plays a pivotal role in
memory and prospection.
In a fMRI study of optimism (Sharot et al., 2007), participants
came up with positive or negative life events (e.g., “get mar-
ried” or “lose my love”) that happened in the past or that might
happen in the future. After scanning, participants rated their sub-
jective feeling toward their memories and projections and also
ranked their prevalence of optimistic qualities in them. A set of
regions including theMPFC, the PCC, and the amygdala were acti-
vated in mental simulations of past and future emotional events.
However, activity in the rostral anterior cortex (rACC) and the
amygdala was diminished when imagining negative future events
rather than positive ones, and was also diminished in remem-
bering of past events despite the use of controls to account for
differences in pre-experiencing. Behavioral results also showed
that it was only during prospection that participants became more
attached to positive events than to negative ones. The MPFC
and the PCC contribute to retrieve autobiographical informa-
tion. Particularly, when imagining positive future events relative
to negative ones, the amygdala and the rACC were speciﬁcally
activated. The effect of arousal on positive events resulted in
more activation in the amygdala (Mickley Steinmetz et al., 2010)
and the amygdala always modulates memory and decision mak-
ing. An important role in the ACC is assessing and regulating
emotional and motivational information so that people can pay
attention to positive future scenarios (Sharot et al., 2007). In con-
clusion, for both memory and prospection, representations of
positive episodes are closely connected to a more powerful sub-
jective feeling than negative ones; this emotional arousing, to
some extent, can help human motivate their future decisions
and plan to maximize the probability of achieving certain goals
(D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004).
Taken together, these studies suggest that both memory
and prospection are dependent on visual–spatial context, self-
processing and emotions (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Szpunar
et al., 2007; Maguire and Mullally, 2013). Such a close link between
memory and prospection suggests that the dysfunction in one
system may be correlated with the malfunction in another system.
In addition, we have provided a summary of the reviewed and
discussed neuroimaging studies in Table 1. Table 1 includes a
summary of task, the overlapping brain regions between memory
and prospection, and the distinct brain regions between memory
and prospection.
LESION STUDIES
Recent lesion studies also conclude that memory and prospection
share similar processes-patients with amnesia also have impair-
ment in imagining their future (Tulving, 1985; Rosenbaum et al.,
2005; Kwan et al., 2010). Numerous studies, especially focusing
on amnesic patients, have highlighted the importance of the hip-
pocampus in memory and prospection (Addis et al., 2004, 2009b;
Kwan et al., 2010; Maguire et al., 2010; Squire et al., 2010). Hassabis
et al. (2007b) asked amnesic patients with hippocampus damage
to vividly imagine something ﬁctitious that may happen in the
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future (e.g., “Imagine you’re lying on a white sandy beach in
a beautiful tropical bay”) and then to describe it in details.
Results demonstrated that patients with hippocampus dam-
age lacked spatial coherence in scene construction compared
with control participants. For example, when participants were
asked to generate novel events occurring in the context of an
exotic beach, some of them were only able to imagine the
sky but the control group could imagine something highly
detailed, even integrated scenarios, suggesting that the hip-
pocampus may contribute to imagining new experiences and
re-experiencing episodic memory by providing the spatial con-
text for the fragmented elements of an experience (Hassabis
et al., 2007a). Other case studies also described a case of H.C.
with developmental hippocampus loss whose deﬁcits in rec-
ollection and imagination were reﬂected in the inability to
generate past and future events (Kwan et al., 2010). What an
interesting observation is that her future description lacked self-
relevant information, suggesting that H.C. fail to contextualize
imagination with personal information. Similarity, another auto-
biographical amnesic patient named K.C., who suffered from
hippocampus lesions due to a head injury, was also unable to
imagine speciﬁc episodes in his personal future (Tulving, 1985;
Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Hippocampus not only affects spa-
tial and self processing, but also our evaluation of future
outcome. White matter volume in the hippocampus is posi-
tively correlated with delay discounting severity, indicating that
discounting of future events might depend on one’s ability
to remember past events or discounting of past rewards (Yu,
2012).
The aforementioned ﬁndings seem to conclusively indicate
that the hippocampus is involved in retrieving autobiographi-
cal memories, imagining ﬁctitious episodes and simulating the
future personal events. However, in contrast to the studies
mentioned above, several researchers have argued that patients
with hippocampus damage still retain future-oriented think-
ing ability. For instance, research found that P01 did well in
tasks of memory and prospection, despite his dense amnesia
and hippocampus damage (Aggleton et al., 2005; Hassabis et al.,
2007a). Consistent with the case of P01, another patient Jon,
with 50% volume loss in his hippocampus, was also able to
retain some memory experience and construct future scenarios
(Maguire et al., 2010). Speciﬁcally, Cooper et al. (2011) used a
naturalistic novel autobiographical memory task to assess the
ability of past retrieval and imagination of school-age children
who had hippocampus damage and autobiographical memory
deﬁcits. Results showed that hippocampus volume in patients
correlated positively with memory recall task, but there was
no signiﬁcant relation between the hippocampus volumes and
scene construction scores. One possibility is that some resid-
ual remaining hippocampus is sufﬁcient for patients to construct
ﬁctitious and future scenarios (Maguire et al., 2010). Another pos-
sibility is that patients suffer from early damage could develop
further strategies and that their relatively semantic memory in
residual hippocampus may facilitate the future-oriented think-
ing (Cooper et al., 2011). Over all, it remains unclear why a
parallel effect was uncovered in some cases but differential in
others.
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
In addition to neuroimaging studies and lesion studies, con-
verging lines of evidence from development psychology suggest
that memory shares the same processes with future think-
ing (Suddendorf and Busby, 2003; Busby and Suddendorf, 2005;
Addis et al., 2008). Busby and Suddendorf (2005) asked 3-, 4-, and
5-year-old children to report what they did yesterday and what
they would do tomorrow. Moreover, children were required to
recall events that had not occurred yesterday and would unlikely
occur tomorrow. Results demonstrated that children aged 4 and
5 were capable of answering the question while only a minority
3-year-old children could successfully complete the task, suggest-
ing that the development of memory facilitates the development
of prospection to some extent. Verbal task, such as simply asking
children what they did and what they will do may test children’s
language ability, rather than their memory and prospection abil-
ities (Atance and Meltzoff, 2005; Atance and Sommerville, 2014).
Therefore Atance and Meltzoff (2005) used stories and pictorial
scenes to evoke particular physiological states (e.g., hungry, thirsty,
cold). They instructed children to imagine themselves in these
scenarios and to choose one item to bring with them into the
situation as well as to provide an explanation. When items were
semantically associated with the scenarios, the performance of the
3-and 4-year-olds was negatively affected and did not address the
future state, whereas the 5-year-olds were outperformed during
the process.
Along a similar line, research about older adults also con-
ﬁrms that memory and prospection develop in parallel-with
age increase, deﬁcits occur both in the processes of retriev-
ing and imagining (Addis et al., 2008; Gaesser et al., 2011;
Rendell et al., 2012). Recent studies used different paradigms like
cue-word task (Addis et al., 2008), experimental recombination
paradigm (Addis et al., 2010) and autobiographical task as well as
semantic-visuospatial control task (Addis et al., 2011b) to assess
memory and prospection of older adults. Results indicated that
older adults generate fewer episodic details and internal details
when recalling and imagining, suggesting age-related simulation
deﬁcit to conditions of retrospection and prospection (Gaesser
et al., 2011).
Though numerous studies argue that retrospection and
prospection ability may co-develop and draw on similar cognitive
process, some ﬁndings were inconsistent with such conclusion
(Busby Grant and Suddendorf, 2009; Suddendorf, 2010). For
example, Busby Grant and Suddendorf (2009) asked preschool
children to place pictures representing different events at appro-
priate places in order to assess their capability of distinguishing
the times of events. Result showed that subjects aged 3 and 4
performed equally well in the memory task, but subjects aged 4
performed better in differentiating daily events from more remote
future events within prospection task, suggesting that ability of
memory and prospection do not develop in parallel (Busby Grant
and Suddendorf, 2009).
Why do memory and prospection performances vary so widely
between the ages of three and four in these various studies? One
possibility is that children failed to understand terms referring to
future in different experiments (Busby and Suddendorf, 2005).
Requiring children to differentiate the times of events in both the
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past and the future (Busby Grant and Suddendorf, 2009) may test
children’s comprehension of temporal distance rather than their
ability in memory and prospection. As 4-year-old children have
a more developed language ability and comprehension capability,
they are more likely to perform better in future-oriented tasks.
Another possibility is that different paradigms (verbal task, item
choice, item placement) require different amounts of cognitive
control, which is involved in thinking about our personal future.
In item selecting, children failed to inhibit choosing an item asso-
ciated with the scene (Atance and Meltzoff, 2005; McCormack
and Atance, 2011). It is likely that children did not experience
the state requiring anticipation (e.g., children were not currently
cold), and they may feel difﬁcult to draw upon this state as an
explicit reason for selecting the correct item (Atance and O’Neill,
2005).
In summary, development studies with preschool children and
elderly adults reveal a similarity between memory and prospec-
tion, but the different deﬁnitions of future in different paradigms
and the varying degrees of difﬁculty in various tasks have led to
inconsistent conclusions (see Table 2 for a summary of develop-
ment studies discussed herein, and Table 2 includes comparison
of age, task, and individuals’ performance on memory and
prospection).
DISTINCT COMPONENTS BETWEEN MEMORY AND
PROSPECTION
A forementioned studies have demonstrated the close relation-
ship between memory and prospection. However, memory and
prospection are two distinct processes and it is important to tease
apart the distinct components of memory and future thinking.
To some extent, it has been argued that prospection involves
more goal-directed processing, cognitive control, and associative
learning as well as creativity (D’Argembeau et al., 2010; Gerlach
et al., 2011; Chiu, 2012; Christian et al., 2013). Imagining you
are going to hold a birthday party, the ﬁrst step is to set up a
speciﬁc goal-when and where to hold a birthday party and who
to invite. You might highly in this situation depend on cogni-
tive control to sustain your working memory and to maintain
action sequences while planning. For instance, you may have
simultaneous, competing wishes to hold a birthday party, take
a trip with your family, or enjoy coffee with your friends. But
designing a wonderful birthday party keeps you focusing on the
current goal and on taking action to promote your project. Then
you should make a more deﬁnite plan by associating past expe-
riences with your current situation. For instance, if you had
learned that apple pie was more popular than banana pie at
your last birthday party, you might be more likely to prepare
apple pie this time. However, simply representing past experi-
ence is not enough; you also need to design something original
in order to surprise your guests with your creative thinking (see
Figure 3).
GOAL-DIRECTED PROCESSING
Personal goal-setting has been hailed as a shortcut to detail-
speciﬁc future construction. Prospection is viewed to become
goal-directed, with actions like planning, and problem solving
(Christian et al., 2013). Besides, goal-directed learning provides
more details of problem solutions, even available accesses to infor-
mation and provides a causal structure to think deeply (Taylor
et al., 1998; Gerlach et al., 2011; Christian et al., 2013). However,
the neural processing of goal-directed processing and its relation
with prospection are little known. Researchers have examined how
goal-directed processing shapes prospection and how the concept
be discussed across discrete functional domains (Gusnard et al.,
2001; D’Argembeau et al., 2010; Niendam et al., 2012).
D’Argembeau et al. (2010) investigated the neural basis for
personal goal processing when envisioning the possible events
of the future. In this experiment, participants were scanned
as they simulated the hypothetical future related to their per-
sonal goals (e.g., of getting married next summer) and future
events unrelated to their personal goals (e.g., of going to the zoo
in 2 weeks). Each of these tasks was compared with a control
task only involving the construction of mental representations
of intricacies. Results showed that imagining the future related
to personal goal elicited stronger activation in the vMPFC and
the PCC compared with imagining non-personal future scenar-
ios. The vMPFC and the PCC mediate self-referential processing
across evaluation, code and contextualization in mental represen-
tation (D’Argembeau et al., 2010). Similarly, a study conducted by
Gusnard et al. (2001) concluded that the MPFC had the highest
metabolic rate at rest and exhibited decreases across goal-directed
behavior. The PCC contributes to prospection contextualiza-
tion (D’Argembeau et al., 2010), autobiographical information
recollection (Svoboda et al., 2006; Spreng et al., 2009) and self-
knowledge generation (Northoff et al., 2006). Overall, the vMPFC
and the PCC might support the processes that contribute to
appraisal, code, and contextualize the future scenarios regard-
ing personal goals and self-schema (D’Argembeau et al., 2010).
During autobiographical planning condition, the frontoparietal
control network coupled its activitywith the default network. Crit-
ically, the frontoparietal control network has been associated with
executive control processes including planning, initiation, and
so forth (Niendam et al., 2012). Therefore, both the default net-
work and the frontoparietal network likely support introspective
processes that require goal-directed cognition in self-referential
processing.
COGNITIVE CONTROL
Cognitive control is a special capability of human beings, under
which individuals can regulate, coordinate, and sequence their
thoughts and actions based on internally maintained behavioral
goals (Braver, 2012). According to dual mechanisms of control
(DMC) framework, two distinct operating modes modulate the
operation of cognitive control: “proactive control” and “reactive
control” (Braver et al., 2009). The proactive control mode can
be seemed as a form of “early selection,” which helps individu-
als to maintain goal-relevant information before the occurrence
of demanding events and to keep perception, attention and
action system in a goal-driven manner (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
By contrast, the reactive control is a form of “late correction”,
in which attention is only recruited after a high interference
event is detected. Therefore, based on interpretation of “proac-
tive control” and “reactive control,” it is easy to link cognitive
control withworkingmemory (Baird et al., 2011), problem solving
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FIGURE 3 | Distinct processes of prospection. In order to plan a
birthday party, ﬁrst we should: (1) set a speciﬁc goal, such as where to
hold the party and who to invite; (2) our planning might next rely
heavily on cognitive control to focus on current goal-of holding a
birthday party, without regard to other considerations; (3) and eventually
in order to generate a more speciﬁc plan you might associate with past
experiences to better plan your party. An example might go that, having
learned that apple pie was more popular than banana pie at your last
birthday party, you are now subsequently more likely to prepare apple
pie this time around; (4) further to actualize and promote your party,
you may also need creativity thinking to facilitate designing something
unique.
(Monsell, 2003), working memory (Baird et al., 2011), problem
solving (Monsell, 2003), as well as planning, and execution (Chan
et al., 2008). Take to solve a problem as an example: we need
to (1) integrate and sustain more working memory, as well as
initiate, organize, and monitor relevant memory to keep the scene
and associated problems in mind (Kane and Engle, 2003); (2)
envision and encode abstract action sequences which lead to the
problem’s solution and maintain movement plans (Gerlach et al.,
2011); (3) construct new representations based on the past in order
to pre-experience the event (Baird et al., 2011; Kane and McVay,
2013).
Recent research has focused on association between prospec-
tion and cognitive control (Kane and Engle, 2003; Okuda et al.,
2003). Baird et al. (2011) found that there is a positive corre-
lation between working memory capacity and future-oriented
thinking. Working memory is a general cognitive resource,
and prospection demands cognitive control, therefore working
memory can help individuals to integrate past events stored in
memory to construct new representations (Baird et al., 2011;
Kane and McVay, 2013). Similarly, evidence from neuropsycho-
logical and neuroimaging suggests the default network and the
executive network are coactive during prospection (Rowe et al.,
2001; Spreng et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2011). Gerlach et al. (2011)
designed a problem-solving task and instructed participants to
solve speciﬁc problems in imaginary scenarios. Results revealed
activation in the default network and regions associated with exec-
utive function and cognitive control, including the DLPFC and
the MPFC. Similarity activated regions like the DLPFC are also
reported by Spreng et al. (2010), whose study used planning task
to test whether the frontoparietal control network would cooper-
ate with the default network to mediate goal-directed cognition.
TheDLPFC is proved to activate onperformanceof executive plan-
ning task (Rowe et al., 2001), suggesting that cognitive control is in
the service of future thinking such as planning and goal-directed
processing.
ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING
The associative theory suggests that learning is driven by a pre-
diction error which is generated by an unexpected outcome or by
its unexpected omission (Corlett et al., 2004). The associative pro-
cessing links retrospection and imagination. It helps individuals to
project and imagine a conceivable future scene by integrating past
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experience in the imaging process. Numerous studies have recog-
nized the close relationship between prediction-error processing
and delusion formation (Corlett et al., 2004, 2006; Gradin et al.,
2011). Prediction error, the variation between expectancy and
actual outcomes, guides adaptive behavior by allocating attention
to critical environmental stimuli and creating a casual associa-
tion between stimuli and environment (Corlett et al., 2006). While
patientswith schizophrenia,whodisplay deﬁcits in both retrospec-
tion and imagination (D’Argembeau et al., 2008) can easily create
aberrant beliefs or illusions when a stimulus has not been pre-
sented previously but remembered falsely (Johnson, 2006; Corlett
et al., 2009). Using associative learning task, Corlett et al. (2007)
compared prediction-error-related brain responses in healthy par-
ticipants and in individualswith schizophrenia. Result showed that
the frontal cortex was activated during disrupted prediction-error
processing and delusion formation, indicating that schizophrenia
inappropriately represents theworldwith extraneous information.
Another study using psychotomimetic drug ketamine found that
the greater the magnitude of the DLPFC response is, the more
likely individuals experience drug-induced perceptual aberrations
or delusion of reference (Johnson, 2006). These lines of evidence
indicate that inappropriate engagement of the DLPFC mediates
odd perceptions and delusions. The PFC may use information
learned in past experience to construct future events via associative
learning.
CREATIVITY
Creativity processing is the sequence of thoughts and actions that
leads to innovative generation and adaptive productions (Lubart,
2001). When imagining our future lives, we need creativity think-
ing to propose novel ideas and to generate unique solution to
penitential problem.
Chiu (2012) conducted an experiment using the priming task
to assess the association between future thinking and creativity
thinking. Participants were required to imagine their life 50 years
from now, 5 years from now, and in the present day, respectively.
Results showed that creative imagination was better utilized in the
50-year future thinking group. Construal Level Theory suggests
that temporal distance changes people’s reaction to future stim-
uli by reconstructing their mental representations of the future
events. Speciﬁcally, as the temporal distance increases, events are
represented in a more abstract and general way (Liberman and
Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman, 2003). That is to say, in the
Chiu (2012) study, individuals considering condition in the distant
future engaged in abstract and high-level representations while
those prospecting for the near future formed low-level represen-
tations. High level and abstract cognitive processing can facilitate
creative thinking performance, which implies that even subse-
quent creative thinking requires abstract thought (Förster et al.,
2004).
Comparable levels of activity in MTL regions were observed
during both memory retrieval (Squire et al., 2004) and associa-
tive processing (Eichenbaum, 2000), which suggests that the MTL
network might be important for creativity thinking by associating
past experiences with novel idea (Ellamil et al., 2012). The MTL
network also underlies both memory and prospection (Schacter
et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Kowatari et al., 2009; Ellamil
et al., 2012). It may provide access to stored details, recombine
the detail to speciﬁc context and encode a simulation to inﬂuence
and guide future behavior (Addis and Schacter, 2011). The asso-
ciative function of the MTL network implies that both creativity
and prospection share same cognitive process. As future thinking
is not just the replication of past memory, but a reconstructed
processing, it may cooperate with creativity process to generate
unique ideas and to construct novel scenes.
However, we are still concerned that readers may confuse the
discreet concepts of prospection and of memory with another
relevant concept- “prospective memory.” Prospective memory is
a form of memory for an intention to perform a planned action
in the future (Okuda et al., 1998; Kvavilashvili et al., 2001) and it
is rather prevalent in daily life, including some simple tasks such
as remembering to compete in a marathon at 9 am or to take pills
to stabilize our condition when we are in the bedroom (McDaniel
and Einstein, 2011). Prospective memory and prospection differ
on the point that prospection emphasizes foreseeing and planning
for the future, while prospective memory concerns remembering
to perform intended future events at appropriate time, rather than
toomuch explicit information (Baddeley, 1997; Bayen et al., 2008).
MEMORY AND PROSPECTION IN PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
Complementing the above data, recent neuropsychological stud-
ies of psychiatric disorders also provide evidence for distinctions
between memory and prospection. Dysfunctions in different pro-
cesses in remembering and future thinking may result in different
psychiatric disorders, on the basis of different causes of deﬁ-
ciency, which can be classiﬁed into certain types. For instance,
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is mainly the result of cog-
nitive control and emotional processing dysfunction (Brown et al.,
2013a,b); schizophrenia is a result of context processing and self-
processing dysfunction (Williams et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2002;
D’Argembeau et al., 2008); autism is on account of self-processing
impairment (Lind and Bowler, 2010); and Parkinson’s is due to
cognitive control deﬁcit (de Vito et al., 2012).
Considerable evidence shows that patients with psychiatric dis-
orders, such as PTSD, autism, schizophrenia, or Parkinson’s, not
only exhibit deﬁcits in memory of past experiences, but also are
impaired in imagining the future (D’Argembeau et al., 2008; Lind
and Bowler, 2010; Brown et al., 2013a,b). PTSD-affected partici-
pants tended to recall their memories and imagine future events
with less episodic speciﬁcity (also be deﬁned as overgeneralization;
Brown et al., 2013a,b). Functional avoidance, and executive dys-
function, as well as ruminative thinking might result in patients’
overgeneralized memory (Williams, 2006). Moreover, construct-
ing scenarios during memory may increase perception of future
trauma, so individuals with PTSD are more likely to focus on cur-
rent distress but not past or future, and as a result, generate more
overgeneral autobiographical memories than the normal (Brown
et al., 2013b).
Patients with schizophrenia, who could not project themselves
into speciﬁc past and future, possibly due to difﬁculties in retriev-
ing contextual information from memory, constructing strategic
representations, as well as experiencing a continuity of subjec-
tive time (Williams et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2002; D’Argembeau
et al., 2008). On the whole, schizophrenia may be inﬂuenced by
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impaired self-concept as well as by interference in diverse tempo-
ral dimensions of the self (D’Argembeau et al., 2008). Although
preliminary, it should be noticed that patients with schizophrenia
show greater deﬁcits in prospection tasks than in memory tasks,
possibly because of the increasing demand on former processes.
Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show atten-
uation in episodic memory and future thinking, and they are
more likely to mentally re-experience past events from an observer
(third-person) perspective (Lind and Bowler, 2010). This is prob-
ably due to dysfunctions in self-related processing. When patients
with Parkinson’s were asked to imagine plausible future episodes,
they generated fewer future episodic details than a healthy person
(de Vito et al., 2012). On the contrary, patients with Parkin-
son’s did not show any difference with matched controls in the
task of remembering past events, suggesting that the poor per-
formance in the future thinking task is associated with poor
executive control but not with impairment of memory (de Vito
et al., 2012). Further research should be conducted to explore pre-
cise mechanisms of memory and prospection in various patient
populations.
A MEMORY-PROSPECTION MODEL
Remembering and imagining are two radically different processes;
however, in our daily life we can utilizememory to construct future
scenarios conceptually, which suggests a close overlap between
memory and prospection. Past experience or acquired knowl-
edge alone is not sufﬁcient to solve a perceived problem or to
create a new idea about the future, indicating that there are
several distinct components recruited in prospection. Here, we
present a memory-prospection mode to clarify the association
and distinction between memory and prospection. In this model,
some psychological processes are common to both memory and
prospection, including visual–spatial association, self-processing,
and emotion. These functions may involve the hippocampus, the
MPFC, the amygdala and the insula. The MPFC is linked with self-
referential processing and especially with coding and evaluating
personal goals (D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Schmitz and Johnson,
2006). The amygdala performs fundamental roles in the storage of
memories and decision making associated with emotional events
(Sharot et al., 2007).
Beyond its similarities with memory, prospection may also
engage goal-directed processing, cognitive control, associative
learning, and creativity thinking. Brain regions containing the
vMPFC, the dorsal ACC, the PCC, the DLPFC, the precunus, and
the hippocampus may be differentially recruited by prospection.
The vMPFC and the PCC might support appraisal, code and con-
textualize the future scenarios with personal goal (D’Argembeau
et al., 2010). The DLPFC is related with cognitive control such as
planning for the future and achieving a certain goal (Rowe et al.,
2001). Besides, the hippocampus, a pivotal part of both memory
and prospection, is believed to store information, recombine the
information to a speciﬁc context, and encode memory to future
behavior (Schacter et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008).
The interactions among these brain regions may contribute
to the memory-prospection transformation. We emphasize that
these mechanisms are not independent or mutually exclusive but
might combine together as complementary ways to envision the
past and the future (see Figure 4).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In conclusion, evidence from neuroimaging, lesion, development,
and psychiatric disorders studies clearly indicates a close rela-
tionship between memory and prospection. Both memory and
prospection share similar processes including visual–spatial con-
text, self-processing, and emotional activity. Patients with brain
lesion and some psychiatric disorder show co-occurring deﬁcits
in memory and prospection, while healthy pre-school children
and older adults who fail at remembering also fail to project,
FIGURE 4 | Interactionist model of memory and prospection.The overlap and distinct components between memory and prospection are presented in the
model; the regions in the parentheses represent corresponding activated regions.
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indicating that prospection adeptly calls on some common psy-
chological processes to generate new future scenarios. The overlaps
suggest that prospection adeptly calls on some common psy-
chological processes to generate new future scenarios. However,
memory does not solely constitute prospection. We have discussed
distinct components such as goal-directed processing, cognitive
control, associative learning, and creativity that may link memory
to prospection. We propose an interactionist model for mem-
ory and prospection to elucidate how memory is transferred into
prospection.
Future research will be needed to know what precise mech-
anisms enable distinct aspects of the mind to transfer memory
into prospection, and how they interact with each other. Func-
tional connectivity analysis is needed to further investigate how
different regions of the brain talk to each other in the process of
prospection. Finally, there is much yet to examine so as to a more
precise interactionist model and a broader understanding of the
relationship between memory and prospection.
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